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Despite Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s highly promoted efforts at concentrating additional police patrols in the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods, many crime-ridden police districts still have fewer officers patrolling their streets than far safer areas of the city have, according to recent data obtained by The Chicago News Cooperative.
The data included officer-assignment data for all 9,400 Chicago police officers, as well as almost 1,000 detectives — information that the city has steadfastly declined to make public.
The analysis found that the distribution of patrol officers among the city’s 25 police districts does not correlate to the places where crime rates are highest.
(Click here to search a map of police staffing and crime rates by district)
The 5th police district, which includes the Roseland and Pullman neighborhoods on the Far South Side, has 266 patrol officers, four fewer than the 270 officers in the 12th district on the gentrified Near West Side, the data showed.
But the 5th district experienced 1,049 violent crimes in the first eight months of this year, while the 12th district recorded 341 violent incidents during the same period, according to police department records.
Many predominantly black districts on the South and West Sides had more than three or four murders, rapes, armed robberies or assaults for every beat officer assigned to work within their boundaries during that period.
That contrasted drastically with 10 districts, mostly in more affluent sections on the North Side, where there were one or two such crimes for every officer.
Many City Council members and neighborhood activists have long campaigned for a police department reorganization that would put more officers in high-crime neighborhoods. Told of the deployment data analysis, they said the results vindicated their demands.
“It basically validates the need for redeployment and reallocation,” said Alderman Anthony Beale, whose 9th Ward is largely in the 5th district.
Beale said this week that he would call for Council hearings on staffing levels in police districts. He said he had unsuccessfully sought deployment statistics from the police for years.
“Putting the most police in the areas with the most crime — it’s just that simple,” said the Rev. Marshall Hatch, whose New Mount Pilgrim Missionary Baptist Church is in a West Side police district with the second-lowest proportion of police officers to violent crimes.
Lt. Maureen Biggane, a spokeswoman for the police department, said officials were in the process of “right-sizing the department” and had focused initial redeployment efforts on the highest-crime districts. The debate over how best to deploy police officers has raged for decades, with representatives of more tranquil corners of the city successfully blocking repeated attempts to shift greater resources away from their neighborhoods to the most violent districts.
The topic has become especially heated as City Hall’s budget problems have worsened in the past few years. Even after the planned closing of three district stations, the police department would remain by far the largest component of the budget.
Police spending is slated to drop by 4.4 percent in 2012, to about $1.26 billion out of the total city budget of $6.28 billion.
During economic boom times, former Mayor Richard M. Daley promised and delivered expansion of the police ranks. When the city’s budget deficits grew, the Daley administration allowed the police force to dwindle.
In 2008, officials reluctantly confirmed that they had been forced to renege on Daley’s vow to hire new officers, and police academy classes ceased training cadets. Retirements and other attrition quickly drove down the count of sworn officers on the payroll.
Since his inauguration in May, Emanuel and his new police superintendent, Garry McCarthy, have faced reality. In presenting his 2012 budget proposal, Emanuel said he would delete more than 1,200 perennially unfilled officer positions from the books “to end the charade of carrying hundreds of police officer vacancies without actually hiring them.”
While acknowledging that they will have a smaller force than the Daley administration once commanded, Emanuel and McCarthy are as leery as Daley was of moving officers from safe neighborhoods to higher-crime areas. Instead, City Hall’s new leaders say they have shifted personnel from the specialized units that Daley built up and reassigned them as beat officers in districts across Chicago.
Emanuel said he had transferred more than 1,000 officers “to beat patrols in our neighborhoods,” removing them from desk jobs and special units.
“Every police district across our city received additional officers,” Emanuel told aldermen in his budget speech on Oct. 12. “Those districts with the most crime got the biggest increases, as it should be.”
Biggane, the police spokeswoman, said eight high-crime districts had benefited from the first redeployment wave, involving 500 officers, and other parts of the city have since received additional patrols.
But the Emanuel administration has declined to provide documentation of those moves. The new administration has adhered to longstanding policies of the Daley administration, whose officials denied Freedom of Information Act requests by contending that public disclosure of documents detailing officer deployment levels would compromise security.
The Chicago News Cooperative recently obtained a list of the unit assignments for the 10,300 sworn Chicago police department employees from a police source who requested anonymity because the department leaders have declined to release it.
The records described the unit assignments as of early October and appeared to reflect the vast majority of the recent personnel moves ordered by the Emanuel administration.
Most of the detectives were assigned to one of the department’s five area headquarters, while about 2,400 of the police officers were either assigned directly or detailed to specialized units, including the narcotics section and the internal affairs division.
It was impossible to deduce from the data exactly where the officers in specialized units were working. The list also did not include supervisors.
The other 7,000 police officers, representing a majority of the department’s sworn members, were each assigned to patrol beats in one of the 25 districts. The number of officers in each district ranged from a low of 191 in the 23rd district to 386 in the 7th district.
A comparison of the beat deployment figures with department statistics for property crimes and violent crimes in each district this year shows:
¶Four districts — the 25th, 8th, 6th and 4th — had higher ratios of both property crimes and violent crimes per officer than the citywide average.
¶The highest ratios of property crimes to beat officer counts were in the 14th, 8th and 25th districts, each of which reported at least 15 property crimes per patrol officer in the year’s first eight months.
¶The lowest proportion of violent crimes to officers was in the 1st district, which covers downtown Chicago, followed by the 19th district on the North Side.
¶The 4th district, in the city’s southeast corner, had the largest gap between staffing level and violence, with 4.05 violent crimes per officer.
The 4th district covers most of the 7th Ward, whose alderman, Sandi Jackson, praised Emanuel for adding officers to areas of greater need, despite tight budget constraints. But asked about the Chicago News Cooperative findings, Jackson replied: “There is absolutely a disparity. We are not where we would want to be ideally.”
Some experts say the reaction of aldermen in apparently underserved districts, though politically astute, would not lead to the wisest policies for fighting crime.
“It is reasonable and rational to expect that there should be more officers in areas with more crime,” said Arthur Lurigio, a professor of psychology and criminology at Loyola University. “But there is no evidence that would necessarily be the case.”
Lurigio said saturating areas with officers often merely pushed criminals to other places that then witnessed a spike in violence.
Still, the city should deploy its police officers based on a formula that would account not only for crime rates but also for average response times to service calls, said Wesley Skogan, professor of political science at Northwestern University’s Institute for Policy Research.
“This is Chicago, so everybody wants more and nobody wants to give up officers,” Skogan said. “Emanuel should use his crisis clout and allocate police resources based on workload.”
Darnell Little contributed reporting.
Where the Crimes Occur
The Chicago Police Department tracks violent crimes and property crimes for each of the city’s 25 police districts.
Where the Beat Cops Are
Most of the city’s roughly 9,400 rank-and-file police officers are either assigned or detailed to one of 25 police districts, but many others work in specialized units.
| Unit | Police Officers |
|---|---|
| 7th District | 386 |
| 18th District | 364 |
| 11th District | 361 |
| 8th District | 359 |
| 6th District | 345 |
| 4th District | 338 |
| 9th District | 325 |
| 3rd District | 320 |
| 25th District | 316 |
| 10th District | 305 |
| 1st District | 296 |
| 15th District | 283 |
| 12th District | 270 |
| 5th District | 266 |
| 2nd District | 265 |
| 24th District | 261 |
| Narcotics Section | 244 |
| 14th District | 233 |
| 22nd District | 223 |
| 19th District | 217 |
| 21st District | 206 |
| 17th District | 202 |
| 16th District | 202 |
| 20th District | 196 |
| 13th District | 192 |
| 23rd District | 191 |
| Alternate Response Section | 186 |
| Public Transportation Section | 128 |
| Gang Intelligence Section | 125 |
| Airport Law Enforcement Unit-North | 103 |
| Education and Training Division | 93 |
| Field Services Section | 81 |
| Traffic Section-Administration | 76 |
| Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit | 69 |
| Special Functions Group | 67 |
| Gang Team Area 2 | 58 |
| Gang Team Area 5 | 54 |
| Gang Team Area 1 | 54 |
| Vice Control Section | 54 |
| Central Detention Section | 47 |
| Evidence and Recovered Property Unit | 45 |
| Gang Team Area 4 | 45 |
| Detached Services-Miscellaneous Detail | 44 |
| Deployment Operations Center | 43 |
| Transit Security | 41 |
| Deputy Chief, Area 4, Office of | 38 |
| Gang Enforcement Section | 38 |
| Gang Team Area 3 | 37 |
| Airport Law Enforcement Unit-South | 35 |
| Internal Affairs Division | 29 |
| Intelligence Section | 28 |
| Asset Forfeiture Unit | 27 |
| Court Liaison Section | 26 |
| Central Investigations Detail | 25 |
| Human Resources Division | 22 |
| Medical Section | 17 |
| Juvenile Intervention Support Center | 13 |
| Police Document Services Section | 12 |
| News Affairs | 10 |
| Special Events Section | 10 |
| Marine Unit | 10 |
| Government Security Detail | 10 |
| Patrol, Bureau of-Administration | 10 |
| Research and Development Division | 10 |
| Youth Investigation Section | 9 |
| District Reinstatement | 8 |
| Detective Division-Administration | 8 |
| Organized Crime Division-Administration | 7 |
| Office of the First Deputy Superintendent | 7 |
| Office of Legal Affairs | 6 |
| Detective Division, Area 5 | 6 |
| Departmental Administration | 6 |
| Forensic Services Division | 6 |
| Special Investigations Unit | 5 |
| Administrative Services-Administration | 5 |
| Equipment and Supply Section | 5 |
| Detective Division, Area 3 | 4 |
| Detective Division, Area 2 | 4 |
| Det. Div. Major Accident Investigations Unit | 4 |
| General Support Division | 4 |
| Audit and Internal Control Division (Inspection Division) | 4 |
| Professional Counseling Services/EAP | 4 |
| Traffic Court/Records Unit | 3 |
| Office of International Relations | 3 |
| Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) | 3 |
| N/A | 1 |
| Detective Division, Area 1 | 1 |
| Detective Division, Area 4 | 1 |
| Mounted Unit | 1 |
| Bomb and Arson Section/Aviation | 1 |
Source: CNC analysis of Chicago Police Department deployment data.
Where the Detectives Are
Most of the Chicago Police Department’s almost 1,000 detectives are assigned to one of five police areas.
| Unit | Detectives |
|---|---|
| Detective Division, Area 2 | 187 |
| Detective Division, Area 1 | 176 |
| Detective Division, Area 5 | 163 |
| Detective Division, Area 4 | 147 |
| Detective Division, Area 3 | 124 |
| Central Investigations Detail | 47 |
| Special Investigations Unit | 28 |
| Bomb and Arson Section/Aviation | 19 |
| Detective Division-Administration | 19 |
| Juvenile Intervention Support Center | 17 |
| Gang Intelligence Section | 15 |
| Forensic Services Division | 9 |
| Internal Affairs Division | 6 |
| Youth Investigation Section | 6 |
| Intelligence Section | 6 |
| Gang Enforcement Section | 4 |
| Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) | 2 |
| Alternate Response Section | 2 |
| Evidence and Recovered Property Unit | 1 |
| Field Services Section | 1 |
| Education and Training Division | 1 |
| Human Resources Division | 1 |
| Deployment Operations Center | 1 |
| Detached Services-Miscellaneous Detail | 1 |
Source: CNC analysis of Chicago Police Department deployment data.


Incredible work in unearthing this data. Unfortunately, some of the analysis and presentation here is disappointing or problematic. After I point out some concerns I have with the analysis, I’d like to suggest a different approach to a story like this.
The authors very thoughtfully restrict their analysis of per-officer crime to “murder, rape, armed robbery and assault”, lucidly explain the history of personnel decisions in the context of the budget under mayors Daley and Emmauel, and include the caveat that specialized units are not accounted for in the analysis.
That caveat, however, leaves out the potential magnitude of the effect of specialized units. If gang and narcotics officers were distributed equally among the city’s 25 police districts, they would contribute about 19 officers per district, a 5-10% growth in staff size. And these units are almost certainly not evenly distributed based on everything the city has said.
If I had to guess, I’d venture to guess that special units focus predominantly on high-crime neighborhoods. I find it telling that we don’t know where narcotics officers work, but I’ll go out on a limb and suggest the cops aren’t busting every coke addict in Lakeview or pot head in Wicker Park. To strengthen this guess, we could look at the allocation of resources: John Burge’s old southwest-side Area 2 has 58 gang officers, while the lakefront-hugging, north-side Area 3 has 37.
If you want to analyze, please include consider and discussion your error margin of error. In this case, the error is at least 10% and probably significantly more.
The headline makes an assertion I don’t think we know. In high-crime areas, too few police? What if the high-crime neighborhoods have the right number of officers and the low-crime neighborhoods have police who are just marking time? What if 4 or 5 cases every 8 months is about right for a beat officer? What if the police had a smaller, better paid staff? This headline could just as easily be written, “In low-crime areas, too many police”.
Based on this data, we don’t know what the right caseload for a competent officer is. While the authors interview a few talking heads, they don’t actually ask any beat officers what they think about their caseload or what they need more or less of. And there’s no comparison with similar cities, which might also provide clues as to how Chicago might best deploy police resources in the face of a tough budget situation.
Finally, we don’t get to see the data or data crunching in any meaningful way. Where’s the Google spreadsheet or Socrata page with clean, redacted data which was correlated with crime data, political data, and population data? Now that would be open data.
Dear CNC, I really appreciate that you dug this up, but there’s room for improvement. Consider a humble request:
I’d be happier if you spent more time cleaning up the data and releasing it to the public in a usable format. Accompany the data with a statement about the its origins (too bad this couldn’t be FOIAed) and the great history of police personnel decisions over the years. Then, take your time interrogating the data and coaxing meaning out of it. Compare and contrast with historical and comparative data. Talk to people with street-level knowledge, including the cops themselves.
It’s a win-win situation. The Chicago Reporter, Progress Illinois, WBEZ, the Chicago Tribune apps team, Northwestern students, Dan Sinker’s next Twitter sock-puppet, and your humble readers can mine and analyse the data if they please, and potentially sharpen the discourse around it. CNC gets to take its time comparing and contrasting, talking to people on the ground, refining visualization strategies, and delivering analysis in smaller, smarter pieces.
Wonderful investigative news story. I’m sure CPD and the mayor didn’t see this coming
This is an excellent story that should be picked-up by every major media outlet in town (and each should be embarrassed and ashamed of themselves.) Kudos to CNC!
One issue: I’m not convinced the index calculated is the correct metric for analysis. i.e. The ratio of violent crime per officer is interesting, but should not be the sole determination of manpower allocation. Consider the 1st & 18th Districts which extend South and North of downtown respectively. While not a source of violent crime there is a high density of people. The civilian-to-police officer ratio (particularly during the day and early evening hours) is staggering.
Additionally the officers downtown are busy with other necessary functions including merely being present. CPD is our first line of defense and charged with being the “watchers” over us. We need to face the reality that Chicago is and will remain a terrorist target. Officers on the street are simply necessary to today’s world.
Beyond terrorism, CPD needs to be present in considerable numbers in order to be ready for some non-terror related accident. A truck vs. CTA bus accident on Wacker at Monroe can really screw-up traffic. We can’t count on EMS/CPD/OEMC/etc to be on site quickly approaching from the North, South, or West.
One metric I would like to see is the response time for different categories of calls to 911. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel recently has an excellent story on response times. That’s an indicator of treatment across different parts of the city. If response times are roughly equal everywhere manpower may not need to be adjusted.
Lastly, Chicago’s crime data is not included in national statistics kept by the FBI because CPD plays too much with the numbers. There’s a whole multi-part series waiting for someone to look into. Would be a Pulitzer for sho’!
I’ve been trying to harness GIS mapping for 18 years to collect and share information that helps people better understand where poverty and related problems are most severe. Such maps can also show the unequal distribution of resources to solve programs and can be used to support public and private sector decisions and actions that help social benefit and workforce development programs grow in high poverty areas. Visit the http://www.tutormentorprogramlocator.net to see a map-directory of Chicago non-school tutor/mentor programs. Visit http://www.tutormentorexchange.net to see ways leaders can use these maps.
The way you’ve used your maps, and the way I’m using maps, can be vastly improved, but without the talent, money and technology to gather and display the information, that is hard to do.
Since the police, fire dept, library and faith groups have facilities in every district they should be among the first to embrace and adopt some of the ideas I share on these web sites. Take a look.